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1  | INTRODUC TION
“You must […] avoid engaging in any activity that involves even the appear‐
ance of impropriety.” IBM includes this statement in its Code of Conduct 
and is not the only company that forbids both actual and apparent uneth‐
ical behavior by its employees. Dell states in its Code of Conduct, “We 
avoid even the appearance of impropriety;” General Motors declares, 
“We expect all employees to avoid the appearance of or involvement 
in conflicts of interest;” and Nestlé stipulates, “Employees must refrain 
from any activity or behavior that could give rise to the appearance or 
suspicion of such conduct or the attempt thereof.” The codes of ethics of 
other large companies, like Walmart, AT&T, Apple, General Electric, and 
Exxon Mobil, also forbid employees from giving rise to the appearance 
of specific unethical behaviors or of unethical behavior in general. There 
is also some anecdotal evidence of the application of this so‐called ap‐
pearance standard (Thompson, 1992). For example, directors from the 
Bank of Hawaii (Engleman, 2005), Google (Paczkowski, 2009), Hulman 
& Co (Associated Press, 2012), Churchill Downs Incorporated (Menmuir, 
2014), and Uber (Golson, 2016) had to resign either to prevent them from 
creating the appearance of unethical behavior or after they have created 
the appearance of unethical behavior.
The appearance standard—also called the double standard of be‐
having and appearing ethically (Gilman, 2003)—is neither new nor 
only typical in the business sector. As early as the first century, Saint 
Paul advised the Thessalonians to “abstain from all appearance of 
evil” (The King James Bible, 1 Thessalonians 5: 22). Several profes‐
sional codes, for example, those of court judges, lawyers, auditors, 
doctors, and politicians, include the appearance standard. The first 
canon of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar 
Association (2011) is, “A judge […] shall avoid impropriety and the ap‐
pearance of impropriety.” The appearance standard does not seem 
unimportant either. The appearance of unethical behavior is seen 
to be almost as important (Luban, 2001) or just as important as ac‐
tual unethical behavior (Abramson, 2000; Dopuch, King, Schwartz, 
& Zhang, 2003). For Gilman (2003), the appearance standard might 
be the most important standard by which to judge the actions of 
public officials. McKoski (2010) observes that people in all kinds of 
professional positions, from doctors to teachers, from sports figures 
to journalists, are often publicly judged by the appearance standard.
At first glance, the appearance standard is appealing. It is highly 
ambitious in that it goes further than prohibiting actual unethical be‐
havior (Pingree, 2007), and it is a great catchall for improper behavior 
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Abstract
While there are companies whose codes of ethics state that mere appearance of 
unethical behavior by employees is morally unacceptable, this so‐called appearance 
standard has hardly received any attention in the business ethics literature. Using 
corporate integrity theory, this article explores the criteria that may explain how 
mere appearances of unethical behavior can arise (i.e., the presence of conflicts of 
interests, the entanglement of these interests, a reputation for lack of integrity, and 
deviant outcomes) and those that may make such appearances morally unacceptable 
(i.e., foreseeability, avoidability, and seriousness). The article proposes remedies for 
preventing and resolving instances when mere appearance of unethical behavior is 
morally unacceptable.
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because appearance encompasses many things (Abramson, 2000). 
The standard thus acts as a safety net because it catches behavior 
that would otherwise “slip through the cracks” of a code of eth‐
ics (McKoski, 2010, p. 1964), and as a tidewater mark because it is 
the leading edge of the organic expansion of ethics (Gilman, 2003). 
However, the appearance standard is a paradoxical norm in that, as 
Thompson (1992) argues, it forbids behavior that is in itself not wrong. 
As such, some scholars regard the appearance standard as contro‐
versial and contestable (Bauer, 2012; Gilman, 2003; Pingree, 2007; 
Samaha, 2012; Smith, 2011). For Luban (2001, p. 26), the problem is 
that appearance is a “conceptual accordion that can expand as widely 
as suits the eyes of the beholder” while the beholder has not analyzed 
the observed behavior properly. It is remarkable that while there is ex‐
tensive debate about the appearance standard in different fields, for 
example, in the legal field (Abramson, 2000; Bassett & Perschbacher, 
2013; Brewer, 2003; McKoski, 2010), the standard has hardly re‐
ceived any attention in the business (ethics) literature. An exception 
is the application of the appearance standard to auditors carried out 
by Collins and Schultz (1995), Spira (1999), and Page and Spira (2005).
The reference that companies make to the appearance stan‐
dard and the ongoing debate about it outside the business (ethics) 
literature raise the question about the meaning and implications of 
the standard for the behavior of business employees (including di‐
rectors and managers). For instance, should an employee not have 
a good friend who works with a competitor (even if the employee 
is able to completely separate friendship from business interests)? 
Should an employee not own any shares in another company that 
does business with his employer (even though the employee is not 
influenced by it in his work)? Should an employee not use in private 
life products of competitors (even if the employee is quite loyal to 
his work)? This article examines both the criteria for when mere ap‐
pearance of unethical behavior by employees is morally unaccept‐
able and the remedies for preventing and resolving such instances. 
We develop a model of both these criteria and remedies because 
as of yet, there is no such model, not even of the appearance stan‐
dard in general. Our focus will be on the individual, as opposed to 
the organizational, level, and our approach is conceptual instead of 
empirical.
Before presenting the model, we first define the appearance 
standard and introduce the Corporate Integrity Theory (Kaptein & 
Wempe, 2002) that we employ to develop the model. We use this 
theory because it is a balanced approach that looks at how an em‐
ployee's character, behaviors, and the consequences of those be‐
haviors are related to each other to form a coherent whole. After 
describing the seven criteria, we introduce the corresponding reme‐
dies. We then discuss a real‐life example to illustrate the applicability 
of the model. In general, the following are the contributions of this 
article: it focuses on a hardly examined but relevant question for 
the business ethics literature; it presents criteria that will help us as‐
certain when mere appearance of unethical behavior is morally un‐
acceptable; it presents a coherent set of remedies; and it advances 
the debate about the appearance standard by using an integrity ap‐
proach for understanding the standard.
2  | DEFINITION OF THE APPE AR ANCE 
STANDARD
Outside the business (ethics) literature, the appearance standard is 
largely discussed with reference to the appearance of impropriety (i.e., 
Abramson, 2000; Luban, 2001; McKoski, 2010). Other related terms 
used are the appearance of immoral behavior, corruption, and wrongdo‐
ing (Driver, 1992; Hellman, 2001; Levin, 2001). This article relates the ap‐
pearance standard to unethical behavior and, following Gilman (2003), 
treats all of the above terms as synonymous. All these terms refer to 
inappropriate normative behavior understood as behavior that is disap‐
proved by society in general or by codes of ethics in particular. This un‐
derstanding follows Jones’ (1991) definition of unethical behavior.
In the literature on the topic, appearance is also referred to as an 
impression, suspicion, belief, form, and mimetic (Carson, 1994; Driver, 
1992; Gustafson, 1987; Samaha, 2012; Smith, 2011). In this article, 
there is no distinction made between these terms. Samaha (2012, p. 
1570) argues that appearance is “an external show or the outward as‐
pect of something based on sense impression, which can be processed 
into a belief about the world.” Something can appear or be perceived 
as something regardless of the ultimate factual accuracy of that per‐
ception (Bassett & Perschbacher, 2013). This is because appearance in‐
volves available information that might or might not accurately reflect 
reality, whereas reality refers to “things that are not illusory, that occur 
in fact, or that have an objective existence” (Samaha, 2012, p. 1571).
The appearance standard concerns the appearance of unethi‐
cal behavior when unethical behavior is in fact absent (Thompson, 
1992). The appearance standard is about behavior that is morally un‐
acceptable only because of how it appears or is perceived. The idea 
behind the appearance standard is therefore not that actual unethical 
behavior is acceptable for as long as others are not aware of it (cf. 
Kolstad, 2016). This would be hypocritical, as Grant (1997) argues, or 
deceptive, as Provis (2010) claims. The key question regarding the ap‐
pearance standard is when does someone who gives the appearance 
of engaging in an unethical behavior—while actual unethical behavior 
is absent—nevertheless behaves unethically simply because the ap‐
pearance has been created. Therefore, the appearance standard is 
not about figuring out whether there is actual unethical behavior, be‐
cause there is as a matter of fact no unethical behavior. Likewise, the 
appearances are not in themselves or intrinsically unethical because 
then they would already belong to the domain of unethical behavior.
3  | AN INTEGRIT Y APPROACH TO THE 
APPE AR ANCE STANDARD
So far, outside the business ethics literature, both a consequen‐
tialist and a deontological approach have been used to defend the 
moral appropriateness of the appearance standard. Driver (1992) 
can be seen as the founder and primary proponent of the conse‐
quentialist approach to the appearance standard. For her, appear‐
ing to behave unethically is morally unacceptable not because the 
behavior has negative consequences in and of itself but because, 
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due to resemblance, the behavior is misconstrued by others to be 
unethical. Driver identifies three negative potential consequences of 
such misconstruals: others are offended, the lives of others are made 
miserable, and the person setting a bad example corrupts himself 
(by developing “a taste for doing the real thing” (p. 333), thus break‐
ing down the resistance to unethical behavior) and others (because 
observing apparent unethical behavior reduces the pressure to avoid 
these unethical behaviors themselves). Therefore, Driver argues, 
people should not give cause for such misinterpretations when they 
lead to such negative consequences.
Hellman (2001) presents a deontological approach to the appear‐
ance standard. She advances reasons why the appearance standard 
can be defended independent of, according to her, controversial, 
empirical claims about the consequences of the appearance. For 
Hellman, the responsibility to avoid appearing to behave unethically 
is based on the relationship between an actor and the observer. If an 
actor has a responsibility toward an observer, then the actor also has 
a moral obligation not to give the observer reasons to misinterpret 
his actions and distrust him. However, “without a relationship, there 
is no such obligation” (p. 666). Although observers may lack the abil‐
ity to confirm or refute their suspicions, this does not preclude them 
from forming reasonable convictions about a behavior. Hellman con‐
cludes that an actor should therefore modify their behavior to ac‐
commodate the epistemic limitations of the relevant observers (i.e., 
with whom they have the right sort of relationship) whose suspicions 
are reasonable (albeit mistaken), even if no harm is caused.
Both Driver's and Hellman's approaches to the appearance 
standard may be useful for showing when mere appearance of un‐
ethical behavior by employees is morally unacceptable. In Driver's 
consequentialist approach, the mere appearance of unethical behav‐
ior involving employees may be morally unacceptable when the ap‐
pearance has specific negative consequences, such as it offends one 
or more stakeholders, it damages stakeholder's interests, or it reduces 
the motivation of employees and other stakeholders to behave ethi‐
cally. Hellman's deontological approach may be useful in that what 
counts as morally unacceptable does not depend on the actual ex‐
pectations and reactions of stakeholders (the observers); otherwise, 
we run the risk that morality falls into the hands of the illogical and 
ill‐informed. For this deontological approach, merely appearing to be‐
have unethically is morally unacceptable when employees give stake‐
holders—that is, the observers with whom they have a relationship 
(thus not everyone in the world)—reason to misinterpret their actions.
Corporate Integrity Theory, as developed by Kaptein and 
Wempe (2002), does not adopt either a deontological or a con‐
sequentialist approach. The integrity approach holds that both 
deontological and consequentialist arguments are relevant in 
determining when behavior in the business context is morally ac‐
ceptable or unacceptable, because both arguments “complement 
each other in many instances” (p. 83). According to Kaptein and 
Wempe, when we choose only one of these approaches, we do 
not do justice to the other one, and we are not in a good position 
to determine when behavior is morally unacceptable. In addition, 
following only one approach can lead to an impasse in a debate 
about what counts as morally unacceptable behavior because one 
tries to convince with arguments from one's own approach and not 
from the other's.
The Corporate Integrity Theory also holds that in determining what 
is morally acceptable and unacceptable behavior, we should not only 
look at the behavior and its consequences but also at the actor's char‐
acter. A person's character is the object of a virtue ethics approach, 
which is concerned with determining the virtues or the excellent 
traits of character that a person should possess (Hursthouse, 1999). 
Integrity is about how an actor's character and behaviors and their 
consequences are related to each other to form a coherent whole. The 
corporate integrity theory emphasizes the coherence between virtue, 
deontological, and consequentialist ethics (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002).
Although neither virtue ethics nor integrity theory has been ex‐
plicitly related to the appearance standard, some scholars suggest 
that a violation of the appearance standard leads to undermining 
one or more virtues, such as credibility, objectivity, impartiality, and 
accountability (Abramson, 2000; Gray, 2005; Michaely & Womack, 
1999; Thompson, 1993). Other scholars suggest that integrity is at 
stake when there is an appearance of unethical behavior. For exam‐
ple, Thompson (1992) is concerned that the integrity of someone 
who acts as the judge in their own court case is compromised, Flamm 
(1996) notes that judicial decisions that appear improper undermine 
the integrity of the courts, and Bauer (2012, p. 94) notes that financ‐
ing political parties threatens the “integrity of the electoral process.” 
Gray (2005) argues that an employee who creates the impression of 
being involved in an unethical behavior may damage their own in‐
tegrity and the confidence others have in their integrity. Moreover, 
as ambassadors and representatives of their company (Kaptein & 
Wempe, 2002), employees may then also damage corporate integrity.
An integrity approach may be useful in defining when mere 
appearance of unethical behavior by employees is morally unac‐
ceptable. It is a balanced approach, as suggested by Kaptein and 
Wempe (2002), in the sense that it takes into account character, be‐
havior, and consequences. This balancing act is necessary to apply 
the appearance standard well, as Gilman (2003) posits. An integ‐
rity approach is also balanced in the sense that, on the one hand, it 
determines within concrete or specific situations when behavior is 
morally (un)acceptable. “The [integrity] approach takes seriously the 
whole: the individual, the context, and the past” (Kaptein & Wempe, 
2002, p. 97). This renders the integrity approach pragmatic, flexi‐
ble, and realistic (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002). On the other hand, this 
approach seeks to avoid lapsing into subjectivism and relativism by 
searching for moral criteria that apply to every situation.
4  | CRITERIA FOR E XPL AINING HOW 
MERE APPE AR ANCE OF UNETHIC AL 
BEHAVIOR ARISES
We now discuss the criteria that explain why or how there can be 
mere appearances of unethical behavior. When we know what these 
criteria are, we can specify when such an appearance of unethical 
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behavior becomes morally unacceptable and consequently, the pos‐
sible remedies that would prevent or resolve them. With this defini‐
tion, we build the model (see Figure 1) of the criteria for when there 
can be mere appearances of unethical behavior (propositions 1–4), 
the criteria for when such an appearance is morally unacceptable 
(propositions 5–7), and the remedies to prevent and resolve mere 
appearances of unethical behavior (propositions 8–11).
We propose here four criteria for how mere appearances of 
unethical behavior come about. We begin with the presence of 
conflicts of interests (whether there is any reason for the belief of 
unethical behavior), followed by the entanglement of these interests 
(concerns the extent to which it is difficult for the observer to find 
out whether the employee deals with the conflicts of interests in 
an ethical way), the employee's reputation for lack of integrity (that 
feeds the observer's impression about how the employee deals with 
the entangled conflicts of interests), and deviant outcomes (the ex‐
tent to which there are indications that the entangled conflicts of 
interests are not dealt with in an ethical way). This approach agrees 
with Gray's (2005, p. 88) observation, made within the legal context, 
that “a finding of an appearance of impropriety is often based on 
a combination of factors and the cumulative effects of the circum‐
stances.” That these criteria explain why there can be mere appear‐
ances of unethical behavior does not preclude that they, especially 
the first two criteria, also explain actual unethical behavior. This is 
logical because the mere appearance is created by some combina‐
tion of things (e.g., the individual, the context, and the past) that 
seem to lead to unethical behavior but, in fact, do not actually do 
in the particular case because there is no unethical behavior. At the 
same time, this does not imply that all criteria that explain actual 
unethical behavior are relevant for creating mere appearances of 
unethical behavior. The four criteria reflect what integrity stands for 
by involving aspects of the three main ethical theories. The criteria 
conflicts of interests and their entanglement refer to deontological 
ethics because they are about someone's behavior, that is, the po‐
sition someone enters into and how transparently one behaves in 
that position. Reputation for lack of integrity refers to virtue ethics 
because it concerns one's moral characteristics. Lastly, deviant out‐
comes refer to consequentialist ethics because this criterion con‐
cerns the consequences of the suggested unethical behavior. The 
extent to which these four criteria apply together gives rise to mere 
appearance of unethical behavior.
4.1 | Conflicts of interests
The first criterion that explains how there can be mere appearances 
of unethical behavior is the presence of conflicts of interests. Like 
Kaptein and Wempe (2002), who start their exposition of Corporate 
Integrity Theory by depicting companies in terms of conflicting in‐
terests, we also start here with conflict of interests because it is the 
ground of supposed unethical behavior. The standard conception of a 
conflict of interests, as advanced by Davis (2001) and elaborated by 
Coleman (2005), postulates that one person is in a relationship with 
another, which requires the person to exercise judgement on behalf of 
the other, and that the person has a (special) interest that tends to in‐
terfere with the proper exercise of judgement within that relationship, 
thereby making the person's judgement less reliable than it would nor‐
mally be. According to this definition, a conflict of interests can arise 
when a person is required to exercise judgement on behalf of another. 
The conflicting interests are, what Thompson (1993) calls, the primary 
and secondary interests. Primary interests are determined by the pro‐
fessional duties of the person. They are the primary consideration in 
any professional decision that the person should make (Carson, 1994). 
Secondary interests are, as Thompson (1993) suggests, not wrong in 
themselves, but they become problematic when they are (believed to 
be) assigned more weight than primary interests. Hence, in a conflict 
of interests, a primary interest tends to be unduly influenced or even 
dominated (Thompson, 1993) by a secondary interest, which then 
renders the judgment of the person making the decision less reliable 
(Coleman, 2005). When there is a conflict of interests, there is “reason 
to worry” (Borden & Pritchard, 2001, p. 79) that the judgment and per‐
formance may be compromised, without suggesting or presuming that 
the decision is necessarily compromised.
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Conflicts of interests are thus relevant for explaining the appear‐
ance of unethical behavior. For this reason, we expect that the more 
prevalent the conflicts of interests are, the more likely it is that the 
impression of unethical behavior will be created. Thompson (1993) 
proposes standards for assessing conflicts of interests. He identifies 
factors that make conflicts more or less problematic. The severity of 
a conflict of interests depends on, for example, the likelihood that 
professional judgment will be influenced or will appear to be influ‐
enced. In assessing such likelihood, Thompson assumes that, within 
a certain range, the greater the value of the secondary interest (e.g., 
the size of the financial gain), the more probable its influence. More 
precisely, the greater the weight of the secondary interest(s) com‐
pared to that of the primary interest(s) (i.e., the greater the negative 
difference in weight between the interests), the greater the chance 
that the secondary interests will be chosen over the primary inter‐
est; thus, that the person will behave unethically. A specific exam‐
ple comes from the study of Steinman, Shlipak, and McPhee (2001), 
where they show that physicians perceive a strong association be‐
tween the value of a gift and its potential to influence physicians’ 
prescribing practices. The scope of the conflict of interests also 
affects the likelihood of a mere appearance of unethical behavior, 
particularly the nature of the relationship that generates the conflict: 
longer and closer associations are more problematic (Thompson, 
1993).
Proposition 1 The greater the conflicts of interests, the 
greater the likelihood of a mere appearance of unethical 
behavior.
4.2 | Entanglement of conflicting interests
A conflict of interests in itself does not create the impression 
of unethical behavior. What makes a conflict of interests prob‐
lematic is when these interests are entangled. When interests are 
entangled, they are difficult or impossible to unravel, with the re‐
sult that it is also difficult to determine whether they are weighted 
ethically (Kaptein & Wempe, 2002). The issue of appearing to be‐
have unethically would not exist if others were fully informed and 
familiar with the relevant facts (Bassett & Perschbacher, 2013; 
McKoski, 2010). Both Driver (1992) and Hellman (2001) see the 
lack of transparency and information about someone's behav‐
ior as a condition for the appearance of impropriety. Thompson 
(1993) sees a lack of accountability, that is, the absence or insuf‐
ficiency of scrutiny or review, as one of the factors that make 
conflicts of interests problematic. The more limited the account‐
ability, the more serious the conflict of interests and the higher 
the risk of unethical behavior. In this respect, Fogel and Friedman 
(2008) explain that a court judge accepting a gift from a litigant 
is problematic because the judge becomes psychologically closer 
to the litigant, making it more difficult for the judge—as the con‐
flicting interests become entangled—to prove that one's own ob‐
jectivity is still intact.
Proposition 2 The more entangled the conflicting inter-
ests, the greater the likelihood of a mere appearance of 
unethical behavior.
4.3 | Reputation for lack of integrity
A conflict of interests and the entanglement of those interests are, how‐
ever, not sufficient to create the appearance of unethical behavior. If 
people's integrity were wholly intact, they would always behave ethically 
and be able to resist the pressure or the temptation to opt for the sec‐
ondary interest. There would be no reason to suspect unethical behav‐
ior because such behavior would not exist. However, the less integrity 
someone has, the more grounds there are to doubt their behavior. Some 
scholars argue that a person's virtues have a weak predictive power on 
behavior (Harman, 2009), whereas others argue that a person's virtues 
have a significant influence on behavior (Alzola, 2008, 2012). Hellman 
(2001) acknowledges that when others are not confident that someone's 
intentions are pure, this will foster the impression of unethical behavior. 
In assessing the appearance of independence and objectivity of auditors, 
Spira (1999) not only asked participants which factors undermine the ap‐
pearance of auditors as being independent and objective, but also which 
personal qualities of an auditor would prevent giving rise to the impres‐
sion that their integrity is compromised. What is relevant is not some‐
one's actual integrity but only what is known about their integrity. It is 
this reputation for integrity that others (can) use in determining whether 
it is merely an appearance of unethical behavior or not.
Proposition 3 The lower the reputation for integrity, 
the greater the likelihood of a mere appearance of un-
ethical behavior.
4.4 | Deviant outcomes
An appearance of unethical behavior is also fostered by symptoms of 
unethical behavior. The greater the number of deviant outcomes that 
indicate unethical behavior, the greater is the impression of unethical 
behavior. In the administration of law, this is referred to as the “smok‐
ing gun” (Cohan, 2002). Attribution Theory, as developed by Heider 
(1958), is useful for explaining how behavior is interpreted and attrib‐
uted to a situation or person. According to Kelley's (1973) Covariation 
Model, in order to ascribe a behavior to a person rather than to the cir‐
cumstances, the behavior must be compared with different situations 
and with the behavior of others. This determines the covariation of 
the behavior. For example, if the wife of a CEO buys shares in his com‐
pany shortly before he makes a public announcement that increases 
the share price, the suspicion that the CEO told his wife about this 
announcement strengthens if his wife had never traded before and 
she was the only one who traded during the period in question. In this 
respect, Abramson (2000) argues that a judge should consider recusal 
when a party involved in the case gives him preferential treatment that 
is not granted to others.
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Proposition 4 The greater the deviant outcomes dis-
cerned, the greater the likelihood of a mere appearance 
of unethical behavior.
5  | CRITERIA FOR WHEN A MERE 
APPE AR ANCE OF UNETHIC AL BEHAVIOR IS 
MOR ALLY UNACCEPTABLE
It is not the individual criteria but their combination that gives 
rise to the mere appearance of unethical behavior. This is con‐
sistent with the view that a conflict of interests is not always 
wrong (Carson, 1994; Coleman, 2005; Davis, 2001). A conflict of 
interests does not necessarily create the appearance of unethi‐
cal behavior because, for instance, a reputation for integrity can 
compensate for it.
To determine when a mere appearance of unethical behavior 
is morally unacceptable, we have to look at the criteria that would 
make an employee blameworthy for creating or causing such an ap‐
pearance. The extent to which someone can be morally blamed for 
merely appearing to behave unethically depends on whether the ap‐
pearance itself is foreseeable, avoidable, and serious. Each of these 
criteria primarily refer to different ethical theories: foreseeability 
is a virtue ethics criterion because it is about someone's ability to 
foresee possible future situations that create the appearance of un‐
ethical behavior; avoidability is a deontological criterion because it 
is about what someone could do to prevent the appearance of un‐
ethical behavior; and seriousness is a consequentialist criterion be‐
cause it refers to the negative effects of the appearance of unethical 
behavior.
5.1 | Foreseeability
No one can be held morally responsible for things that could not 
have been foreseen or predicted by the actor at the moment of 
the action (Aristotle, 2012; Bovens, 1998). The same holds for ap‐
pearing to behave unethically: how others will perceive an actor's 
behavior should be reasonably foreseeable. For example, it would 
be unreasonable to blame the purchaser who, during a flight, finds 
herself seated right next to the sales representative of a firm that 
just submitted a proposal over which the purchaser is the respon‐
sible decision maker. Driver (1992, p. 342) argues that someone 
is only responsible for the misconstruals of others if these could 
have been reasonably predicted: “The agent is, of course, not re‐
sponsible for the odd irregularities of others, since she has no way 
of predicting them.” In our model, the reasonableness depends on 
whether the four criteria mentioned above are foreseeable.
Proposition 5 The more foreseeable a mere appear-
ance of unethical behavior, the more morally unaccept-
able it is.
5.2 | Avoidability
Together with the requirement that the appearance of unethical be‐
havior should be foreseeable for it to be blameworthy, the appear‐
ance should also be reasonably avoidable. Of course, it is erroneous 
to believe that all conflicts of interests are avoidable (Davis, 2001). In 
many professions, situations can arise where a conflict of interests is 
unavoidable (Coleman, 2005). Moreover, people are always biased to 
some degree. For example, Bassett and Perschbacher (2013) observed 
that impartiality of judges is elusive. Carson (1994) thus argues that 
to claim that someone acted inappropriately requires being able to 
suggest some alternative course of action that the person should and 
could have taken: “ought not” implies “should do otherwise.” This con‐
forms with Bovens’ (1998) argument that people can only be blamed 
when alternative forms of behavior, including not doing anything, are 
available. Cervantes and Hanson (2013) give the example of psychia‐
trists who have the dual responsibility of being both therapist and fo‐
rensic evaluator for an inmate. They note that there may be smaller 
systems where in practice assuming this dual role may be unavoidable. 
Neither is it possible to check every flight to make sure there is no one 
on board with whom one might have conflict of interests. Therefore, 
in determining whether the appearance of unethical behavior is mor‐
ally unacceptable, it is relevant to take into consideration the extent 
to which it could have been avoided (Gray, 2005). Particularly in cases 
where it could easily have been avoided, people can then be held 
responsible for creating the impression of unethical behavior. Smith 
(2011) also argues that judges should refrain from joining social net‐
works because preserving their judicial integrity would be easier if 
they did not. Hence, the more care is taken to avoid any appearance of 
unethical behavior, the more consideration it demonstrates for one's 
own integrity and that of one's company. However, the more actively 
an appearance of unethical behavior was created (e.g., say, the pur‐
chaser asked the supplier when he would be traveling so they could be 
on the same flight), the more morally unacceptable it is.
Proposition 6 The more avoidable a mere appearance 
of unethical behavior, the more morally unacceptable it 
is.
5.3 | Seriousness
The blameworthiness of an appearance of unethical behavior does 
not only depend on whether merely appearing to behave unethi‐
cally is foreseeable and avoidable, but also on how serious its con‐
sequences are. The seriousness of the harm or wrong that is likely 
to follow from the appearance of unethical behavior is an important 
criterion for how problematic conflicts of interests are (Thompson, 
1993). One of the consequences Thompson discusses is the indirect 
harm caused by a loss of confidence in the judgment not only of the 
person who creates the impression of unethical behavior but also of 
their colleagues. The more harmful the consequences are, the more 
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problematic is the conflict. Furthermore, Thompson points out that 
the greater the value of the primary interest, the more important it is 
to protect it; hence, the more blameworthy is the person if this was 
not done. For Gray (2005), who makes a case for the relevance of 
the appearance standard for judges, it is the great power entrusted 
to judges that makes their responsibility to avoid any appearance 
of impropriety so great. Driver (1992) also emphasizes the serious‐
ness of the consequences. She notes that the more an agent is in 
the public eye (that is, the larger their audience is), the more care 
he/she needs to take to avoid the appearance of immorality. This is 
because a “bad example can and will have a bad effect on others” (p. 
341). Therefore, the more serious the potential consequences of the 
appearance of unethical behavior are, the greater is the expectation 
that these consequences should be prevented, and the more blame‐
worthy are employees when they fail to do so. In this sense, the em‐
ployee's position in the organizational structure may be relevant. For 
example, the behavior of front‐office employees compared to that 
of back‐office employees could have more impact on others because 
the former is more noticeable. The behavior of board members and 
senior managers are in general more visible than that of lower man‐
agement and employees lower in the organization and therefore 
their consequences are potentially more serious.
Proposition 7 The more serious the consequences of a 
mere appearance of unethical behavior, the more morally 
unacceptable it is.
6  | REMEDIES
The extent to which mere appearances of unethical behavior can 
be avoided (second criterion for the moral unacceptability of such 
appearances) also depends on the available remedies for preventing 
them. Thus, the more remedies are available, the more easily avoid‐
able and more blameworthy is the appearance. A mere appearance 
of unethical behavior is also more morally blameworthy when, once 
created, it continues or is prolonged rather than discontinued or 
resolved. The question therefore is what remedies are available for 
preventing and resolving such appearances of unethical behavior. 
There are different lists of remedies proposed (e.g., Boatright, 2001; 
Brooks, 2001; Coleman, 2005; Davis, 2001; Thompson, 1993). This 
section presents two specific remedies for each of the criteria for 
the mere appearance of unethical behavior.
6.1 | Dispose and decrease
To prevent an appearance of unethical behavior from being consid‐
ered unethical, conflicts of interests could be disposed of. According 
to Coleman (2005), disposing is a usual method for dealing with a 
conflict of interests. Disposing of a conflict means that the conflict 
of interests is removed, eliminated, or, what Lemmens and Freedman 
(2000) suggest as the best option, avoided in the first place. In this 
situation, someone escapes the conflict of interests by, for example, 
divesting and recusing themselves (Davis, 2001). Thompson (1993) 
suggests that removing the secondary interest allows refocusing on 
serving the primary interest. Sanatani (2015, p. 296) also suggests 
“doffing two hats for the sake of one.” This could mean refraining 
from personal trading in shares, changing or splitting a function, 
terminating business relationships with family members and close 
friends, and withdrawing or abstaining from making any decisions re‐
lated to the matter that gave rise to the conflict of interests.
Another remedy is to ease the conflict of interests. In this case, the 
influence of the secondary interest is not removed but only decreased 
(Bell, Friedman, & Friedman, 2005; Fogel & Friedman, 2008). The aim 
of this remedy is to prevent the secondary interest from appearing 
to dominate the relevant primary interest by reducing the former to 
an acceptable level (Thompson, 1993). Examples include receiving 
gifts of limited value and restricting the number and type of sideline 
activities being engaged in and the amount of time spent on them. 
Increasing the value of the primary interest can also reduce the influ‐
ence of the secondary interest. This can be achieved, for example, by 
increasing someone's salary so that they are less vulnerable to getting 
swept along by secondary interests that could threaten their job.
Proposition 8 Disposing	of	and	decreasing	conflicts	
of interests help to prevent and resolve mere appear‐
ances of unethical behavior.
6.2 | Disclose and delegate
Apart from disposing of or decreasing conflicts of interests, we 
can also disclose or delegate them should they be entangled. 
Disclosure or declaration is one of the usual methods for dealing 
with a conflict of interests (Coleman, 2005). Disclosure improves 
transparency, which eradicates the appearance of impropriety 
(Gilman, 2003). For example, by registering and publishing re‐
ceived gifts, sideline activities, reimbursed expenses, stocks, and 
debts others are informed. An advantage of disclosure is that it 
provides those who are potentially affected or those who are oth‐
erwise in a good position to assess the risks the information they 
need to make their own decisions (Thompson, 1993). If disclosure 
is sufficiently complete and understood, it prevents deception, 
gives others opportunity to give informed consent, and makes 
it possible to correct biases by discounting them (Davis, 2001). 
Disclosure also indicates a willingness to account for behavior 
and shows that there is nothing to hide. One way of achieving 
disclosure is by allowing someone to monitor behavior (cf. Davis, 
2001) and giving them the appropriate oversight. Concrete exam‐
ples include letting a compliance officer monitor one's personal 
transactions, letting an independent party evaluate decisions, and 
organizing meetings where one accounts to others. With regard 
the latter, Alleyne, Devonish, and Alleyne (2006) found that the 
perception of an auditor's independence was enhanced by the au‐
ditor's attendance of company's annual general meetings.
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Another remedy for reducing entanglement is delegation 
(Cohan, 2002). Delegation means that if a conflict of interests 
remains, then either the decision is made with someone else (the 
so‐called four‐eyes principle; Pörting & Vahlenkamp, 1998) or 
someone else makes the decisions (e.g., trading one's personal 
shares through a broker or escalating the decision to higher man‐
agement). One can also ask for permission to make a decision (get‐
ting a waiver; Abramson, 2000) or ask for the consent of those 
involved (Zacharias, 1998). Consultation, where others give their 
opinions on the matter but one still makes the final decision, also 
belongs to this remedy. There is of course a risk when delegat‐
ing a decision to someone lower in the hierarchy. Carson (1994) 
illustrates this point with the example of a corporate executive 
whose close friend's daughter applies for a position in his com‐
pany. Because this constitutes a conflict of interests, the executive 
should ask a subordinate to make the hiring decision. However, the 
subordinate might feel pressured to hire the applicant if he is aware 
of the latter's connection with the executive; this also amounts to a 
conflict of interests. Carson's advice is for the executive to ask the 
subordinate to make the decision without revealing his connection 
with the applicant.
Proposition 9 Disclosing entangled conflicts of inter-
ests and delegating decisions help to prevent and resolve 
mere appearances of unethical behavior.
6.3 | Develop and demonstrate
Another remedy for preventing and resolving a mere appearance of 
unethical behavior concerns the development of one's reputation 
for integrity. Thompson (1993) views good character as a remedy. 
Integrity can be developed through education, training, and practice. 
Knowledge and awareness of conflicts of interests and of the rel‐
evant principles equip employees to better address the ethical issues 
that they confront (Fogel & Friedman, 2008). Education about the 
appearance standard is also useful both at the beginning and dur‐
ing the course of one's career (Thompson, 1992). Discussing dilem‐
mas about the appearance of unethical behavior is one way of going 
about this (Cervantes & Hanson, 2013).
These activities to develop one's integrity are not only relevant 
for improving one's actual integrity but also for how others perceive 
one's integrity, that is, one's reputation for integrity. Pearson (1985) 
proposes some measures, such as auditor‐administered educational 
programs, to enhance the perceived independence of auditors. 
Regular training on ethical issues, legal restrictions, and other reg‐
ulations demonstrate that one takes seriously the responsibility to 
nurture and maintain one's integrity. Moreover, when someone's in‐
tegrity is intact but others perceive it to be otherwise, they can try to 
improve their reputation for integrity (cf. Samaha, 2012) by demon‐
strating their integrity even more; for example, by informing others 
about the ethical principles they adhere to, the ethical decisions they 
make, and the ethical impact of their decisions.
An individual's reputation for integrity may also be influenced 
by the organization, the sector, or by the profession to which they 
belong. In the event that this association is or appears to be negative, 
the individual can try to improve the actual or perceived integrity of 
these institutions, for example, by taking the initiative to develop a 
new or improved code of ethics. Such a code can describe the de‐
sired level of integrity of the organization and employees, including 
their responsibility to prevent any appearance of unethical behavior. 
In this regard, Thompson (1993) suggests regulation by both profes‐
sional and governmental bodies as remedy. In his view, regulation 
offers more assurance than individual discretion that conflicts of 
interests will be avoided. Brewer (2003), however, argues that the 
appearance standard is better adhered to in the legal profession 
through understanding it and making a commitment to uphold it, for 
example, through good discussions about its meaning, than by mak‐
ing detailed rules and enforcing them.
Proposition 10 Developing and demonstrating integ-
rity help prevent and resolve mere appearances of un-
ethical behavior.
6.4 | Disprove and differentiate
In the event that there are deviant outcomes or indications of un‐
ethical behavior despite the absence of actual unethical behavior, 
it is possible for someone to defend themselves to resolve the ap‐
pearance of unethical behavior. Doing nothing could come across as 
being indifferent, which is likely to have a negative effect not only 
on the individual but also on the company's reputation for integrity. 
Behaving indifferently is harmful because it provides further fuel for 
continued allegations and suspicions. Disproving deviant outcomes 
is a means of defending oneself. Besides declaring or even swearing 
to one's innocence, one could provide additional information that 
supports one's claims, thus demonstrating that the suspicions and 
allegations are unfounded. Driver (1992) suggests that to avoid the 
appearance that one is wearing animal fur, one can wear a big button 
that says the fur is fake. One can also employ witnesses, experts, and 
auditors to demonstrate that the indications of unethical behavior 
are without substance.
Another remedy is differentiating. In this case, the cause of 
the appearance of unethical behavior is not refuted but put into 
perspective. The aim is to introduce nuance by showing that the 
person's intentions were sound but that it was a matter of bad 
luck, or a concurrence of events, or ignorance. For example, in the 
event that there is the appearance of a friend receiving prefer‐
ential treatment, the individual can demonstrate that there were 
also instances when the friend was not chosen, say, as supplier. 
Instead of denying that one's partner made a large profit trading 
shares of a company about which one had confidential informa‐
tion, one could show that in the past, one's partner also regularly 
traded in the shares of companies one had inside knowledge of 
but that these transactions resulted in significant losses. Instead 
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he did under a cloud of suspicion. Morneau however denied that he 
had done anything wrong because, according to him, he followed the 
advice of the Ethics Commissioner.
Our model helps explain, using available public information, how 
Morneau created the appearance of unethical behavior. We can state 
that all four criteria are met. There is a conflict of interests because 
his primary interest (to serve as minister of the country) tended to 
be unduly influenced by his secondary interest (to benefit from his 
company). This conflict of interests is also entangled despite the con‐
flict‐of‐interest screen because, given his authority and autonomy, 
it was difficult or even impossible to prove to others that his deci‐
sion as Minister was not unduly influenced by his secondary interest. 
Morneau did not have a solid reputation for integrity either because 
since he became Minister, he had been confronted with issues that 
were seemingly damaging to his integrity. For instance, he was 
fined for failing to disclose, for 2 years, to the Ethics Commissioner 
his ties to a private company that held a villa in France. The Ethics 
Commissioner investigated him for his possible involvement in a con‐
tract renewal between Morneau Shepell and the Bank of Canada to 
manage its employees’ pension plans. He was also investigated for 
insider trading because at the end of 2015, he and his father sold 
680,000 shares of Morneau Shepell just before the government's 
proposed tax changes would affect share prices. Furthermore, there 
are deviant outcomes. After Bill C‐27 was tabled, Morneau privately 
earned $2 million in just 5 days. In addition, while he would normally 
respond well to questions, in this particular situation, according to 
the opposition, Morneau walked away from any question. As a 
Conservative parliamentarian said, “The Minister of Finance has be‐
come an expert at avoiding giving answers to Canadians.”
More importantly, our model can be used to establish whether 
the mere appearance of unethical behavior involving Morneau is 
morally unacceptable. Again relying on publicly available informa‐
tion, the model's three criteria indicate that this is the case. The fore‐
seeability criterion is satisfied because Morneau should have known 
that as the Minister of Finance, whose role is to establish the govern‐
ment's financial and tax policy, he would, sooner or later, create the 
appearance of unethical behavior because his company operates in 
the tax domain and that it would profit hugely from new legislations 
in this field. It was quite foreseeable that it would then be hard or im‐
possible to show that his decision making as Minister of Finance was 
not influenced by his private interests and to expect that his reputa‐
tion for integrity would not deteriorate in politics. The avoidability 
criterion is also satisfied because Morneau had available options to 
prevent any appearance of unethical behavior. For instance, there 
were the two measures he took after the pressure from the oppo‐
sition mounted: selling all his Morneau Shepell shares and putting 
his remaining assets in a blind trust. The seriousness criterion is also 
satisfied. Morneau should have known that the mere appearance of 
unethical behavior on his part in this situation would lead to public 
outcry because he is a public figure, he has a big influence in the de‐
cision‐making process of the Canadian government, and there was 
much at stake for Canadians (the bill represented a serious risk to 
their retirement security).
of denying that the expenses one claimed were inflated, one 
could instead show that one did not submit claims for other ex‐
penses by producing the relevant receipts. These cases all employ 
the principles of Kelley's (1973) Covariation Model to counter the 
appearance of unethical behavior.
Proposition 11 Disproving and differentiating deviant 
outcomes help prevent and resolve mere appearances of 
unethical behavior.
7  | AN ILLUSTR ATION: THE C A SE OF BILL 
MORNE AU
To illustrate the various facets of our model, we now discuss an ex‐
ample from real life: the case of Bill Morneau.1 Morneau was the 
CEO of Morneau Shepell Inc., a leading Canadian company that pro‐
vides pensions, employee benefits, and employee assistance pro‐
grams to more than 20,000 organizations that represent millions of 
Canadians. Morneau made the company grow from approximately 
200 employees in 1992 to almost 4,000in 2015. Morneau was de‐
picted as a “fantastically successful businessman” and “an inspiration 
to all Canadian entrepreneurs” (Deltell, 2017). In 2015, he was nomi‐
nated as a Liberal Party member of the Canadian Parliament. After 
he was elected, he was made Minister of Finance.
Having been elected, Morneau faced the question of how he 
should deal with his company's considerable assets (around $30 
million, via a numbered company). He therefore sought the advice 
of the Ethics Commissioner appointed by the Canadian Parliament. 
He followed the Commissioner's recommendation that the “best 
measure of compliance” was to set up a conflict‐of‐interest screen 
that would prevent Morneau from being involved in governmental 
discussions or decisions that would directly affect his company. 
Morneau was allowed to keep his shares in the numbered company 
because he did not directly possess his 2 million Morneau Shepell 
shares. After a year as Minister of Finance, Morneau introduced 
Bill C‐27, a new legislation that allowed pension administrators to 
convert direct‐benefit pension plans to targeted benefit plans. This 
was a change for which Morneau had lobbied when he was CEO of 
Morneau Shepell. The bill would boost Morneau Shepell because it 
would open up new business opportunities given that there were 
only four companies in Canada that administered these types of 
pensions. After the bill was tabled, the share price of his company 
indeed jumped, earning him some $2 million in 5 days. When the 
opposition parties become aware of this, they accused Morneau in 
Parliament for egregious behavior and for creating the impression 
of misusing his function as Minister of Finance. This put everything 
1Data for this example has been collected by reading many newspa‐
per articles about Bill Morneau (some of which are found on https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Morneau) and by analyzing the debates in the 
Canadian Parliament about Bill C‐27, which are found on https://open‐
parliament.ca/bills/42‐1/C‐27/.
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We can also use our model to determine what Morneau could 
have done to prevent and resolve this situation. Because all the four 
criteria for the mere appearance of unethical behavior are satisfied, 
each of the corresponding sets of remedies in our model offers di‐
rection. Regarding the first set, disposing all his shares was one rem‐
edy, because this would have removed his personal financial interest 
in his company; while decreasing, in the sense of selling a part of his 
shares and keeping the rest, would not have been adequate because 
he could still earn a large amount of money. However, although 
Morneau decided afterward to donate to charity $5 million in profits 
that he earned from his shares since he took office, he could have 
also promised to do this earlier on, before he took office. With re‐
gard to the second set of remedies, disclosure necessitated not only 
disclosing his financial situation to the Ethics Commissioner (which 
was what he did), but also, disclosing this in detail to the Parliament 
and to the general public (stakeholders). As one of the parliamentar‐
ians said: “He who has the most control over the nation's finances 
should have the most transparency over his interests.” Delegating by 
putting his assets in a blind trust was also an option, but he only 
did this afterward. The third set of remedies—develop and demon-
strate—necessitated that Morneau should have cared more about 
his reputation for integrity and should not have given cause for the 
two investigations into his behavior (even though he was cleared in 
both cases) and not hidden behind the advice given by the Ethics 
Commissioner. As Stark (2017) stated about the latter, this was 
Morneau's biggest failure because he could have easily answered 
the questions himself. Furthermore, it is crucial for newly appointed 
politicians coming from the business sector to know the moral stan‐
dards in politics, to be trained in dealing with ethical issues, and to 
develop and communicate their views about their own integrity as a 
politician and as a private person. Morneau also admitted afterward 
that he was perhaps naive and that he should have done more to 
make sure that Canadians had absolute confidence in him and on his 
decisions. The fourth set of remedies relates to how Morneau could 
have acted after it became known that he profited from the new bill. 
He could have disproved the accusation by stating that he had always 
supported this bill and by proactively communicating the details of 
the situation instead of saying that he would only answer the ques‐
tions of the Ethics Commissioner. That Morneau misled Parliament 
(i.e., that although he did state when he came into office that he had 
decided to sell all his shares in Morneau Shepell, he did not reveal 
that he put those shares in a numbered company he controlled) is 
not conclusive. The remedy to differentiate could have been applied 
by showing, only if indeed it was the case, that Morneau also had lost 
private money because of other bills he had introduced.
8  | DISCUSSION
One of the contributions of this article is that it focuses on a hardly 
examined but relevant issue in the business ethics literature, 
which will hopefully stimulate more research into the rationale, 
meaning, and implementation of the appearance standard in the 
business context. Another contribution is that our model presents 
criteria for explaining when a mere appearance of unethical be‐
havior involving employees is unethical and the remedies for pre‐
venting and resolving such a situation. The appearance standard 
and its application are thus made more concrete without making 
it too permissive. In this way, we address two common complaints 
against the standard, that is, its vagueness (Gray, 2005) and per‐
missiveness (Bauer, 2012). A final contribution of this article is 
that it applies the integrity approach to the appearance standard, 
which is helpful in advancing the general debate about the latter. 
The proposed model of the criteria for when a mere appearance 
of unethical behavior by employees is morally unacceptable is 
composed primarily of a combination of elements of virtue ethics 
(reputation for lack of integrity and foreseeability of the appear‐
ance of unethical behavior), deontological ethics (entanglement of 
conflicts of interests and avoidability of the appearance of unethi‐
cal behavior), and consequentialist ethics (deviant outcomes and 
seriousness of the appearance of unethical behavior). These ele‐
ments, from what are usually competing ethical perspectives, are 
put together and work as a coherent whole. The model takes into 
consideration “the individual, the context, and the past” (Kaptein 
& Wempe, 2002, p. 97). To illustrate, the avoidability criterion ad‐
dresses the context in which the behavior happened (the options 
available in the specific situation for preventing the appearance of 
unethical behavior); the conflicts of interests criterion addresses 
both the individual and the past (what someone has done to ar‐
rive at the current situation where the interests conflict); and the 
reputation for lack of integrity criterion addresses all three as‐
pects because the reputation for integrity is about someone (the 
individual), it is a judgment formed by others (the context), and 
it has been developed in the course of time (the past). That the 
model takes into account the individual, the context, and the past 
renders the model (more) flexible, realistic, and pragmatic without 
lapsing into subjectivism and relativism. For example, the model 
does not suggest that all conflicts of interests should be removed, 
but only that this depends on the entanglement of these interests 
and someone's reputation for integrity. In this sense, the model 
also helps to identify when the mere appearance of unethical be‐
havior is morally acceptable.
8.1 | Implications for research
This article has implications for future conceptual research in the field 
of business ethics. If the appearance standard is relevant for business 
practice, then business ethical theories, like the Integrative Social 
Contracts Theory of Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), should engage 
with the standard and develop rationales, guidelines, and norms to 
support employees so they avoid creating the impression of unethical 
behavior that can be deemed morally unacceptable. This also holds 
for the development of teaching materials, such as those presented 
by Maclagan (2012) and Singer (2013). To gain a better understand‐
ing of the implications of the proposed criteria for when the mere 
appearance of unethical behavior is morally unacceptable, future 
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research should work out these criteria in greater detail. It is also in‐
teresting to think about how the proposed remedies play a role in 
ascertaining when the mere appearance of unethical behavior is mor‐
ally unacceptable. For example, the avoidability criterion involves the 
idea that the easier and better it is to prevent a mere appearance of 
unethical behavior (which can be easier and more useful as more rem‐
edies are possible), the more blameworthy is an employee for creating 
the appearance because the more morally unacceptable that appear‐
ance is. Another implication regarding the remedies is whether there 
are also specific remedies for the three criteria that determine when 
mere appearance of unethical behavior is morally unacceptable (i.e., 
foreseeability, avoidability, and seriousness). Furthermore, whereas 
this article focuses on the appearance standard at the individual level, 
there is a need to examine the extent to which the model presented 
here applies to the appearance standard at the organizational level. 
Organizations can appear to behave unethically by providing conflict‐
ing services; for example, accountancy firms that provide auditing and 
consulting services to the same client, or securities firms that provide 
investment banking and research services to the same client (Fogel 
& Friedman, 2008; Hayward & Boeker, 1998). Likewise, it would be 
useful to think more about how organizations can and should support 
its employees to conform to the appearance standard.
There are also implications for future empirical research. The 
propositions formulated in this article regarding the criteria and 
remedies require empirical testing. For example, cases of business 
employees who are blamed for merely appearing to have behaved 
unethically can be used in finding out whether and how our pro‐
posed criteria can be applied. Likewise, it is interesting to explore 
whether there are other relevant criteria and remedies. Future re‐
search could also investigate how bystanders and onlookers decide 
when a mere appearance of unethical behavior is morally unaccept‐
able and to what extent this corresponds to our model. In a similar 
vein, it is relevant to examine whether and how companies define 
the appearance standard for their employees. Doing a more system‐
atic analysis of business codes of ethics than the examples given in 
the introduction of this article would be a possibility. If the use of 
the appearance standard is widespread, then this is a strong mo‐
tivation for further studying it. This also provides a starting point 
for studying how the appearance standard is implemented and 
used by companies both to prevent and deal with breaches of the 
standard. This is not only a usual question for the implementation 
of business codes of ethics (MacLean, Litzky, & Holderness, 2015), 
but given the unique character of the appearance standard (i.e., it 
is highly ambitious, a tidewater mark, and a safety net), it is espe‐
cially interesting to learn how companies deal with it. From a be‐
havioral business ethics point of view, it is relevant to examine how 
the appearance standard influences the behavior of employees and 
what its possible negative effects are. Some examples of negative 
effects are employees becoming reluctant to do what is ethical be‐
cause they run the risk of appearing to behave unethically (McKoski, 
2010), or employees giving actual unethical behaviors less attention 
because they are more focused on preventing giving the impression 
of behaving unethically (Morgan & Reynolds, 2002). It would also be 
interesting to learn how the criteria discussed here will develop in 
the future and what the implications would be for the appearance 
standard itself. For example, Smith (2011) described how, with the 
rise of social media, it has become more difficult for court judges to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety. For businesses, the question 
is how this era of increasing conflicts of interests (Coleman, 2005), 
more transparency (Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003), low trust in the integ‐
rity of business (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2013), and high levels of 
observed unethical behavior in the workplace (KPMG, 2013) affect 
the importance of the appearance standard.
8.2 | Implications for practice
This article discussed the relevance of the appearance standard 
for business: companies that do not address the standard in their code 
of ethics should consider including it. Companies that address the ap‐
pearance standard in their code can use the criteria proposed in this 
article as guidelines for explaining to their employees when the mere 
appearance of unethical behavior is morally unacceptable. Because 
the application of the criteria are context bound and specific to the 
individual, companies should make sure that their employees receive 
training to understand how to apply the criteria in practice. In this 
way, employees will develop their integrity, which is not only import‐
ant for preventing morally unacceptable mere appearances of unethi‐
cal behavior, but also for resolving them. This article also offers other 
remedies for companies and their employees. When it is known for a 
concrete situation which criterion explains the appearance of unethi‐
cal behavior, our proposed model can help select the right remedies. 
This has been illustrated by the example of Bill Morneau. In this way, 
companies create a work environment where employees are stimu‐
lated to not behave unethically either actually or merely apparently.
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